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yai raditional studies of monetary policy’s
• impact on the real economy have
I focused on its aggregate effects.
Beginning with Friedman and Schwartz
(1963), modern empirical research in mone-
tary economics emphasizes the ability of pol-
icy to stabilize the macroeconomy. But casual
observation suggests that business cycles
have distributional implications as well, One
way of casting the debate over the relative
importance of different channels of monetary
policy transmission is to ask if these distrib-
utional effects are sufficiently important to
warrant close scrutiny
The point can be understood clearly by
analogy with business cycle research more
generally Ifrecessions were characterized by
aproportionate reduction of income across
the entire employed population—for example,
everyone worked 39 rather than 40 hours
per week for a few quarters—then economists
would pay substantially less attention to
cycles. It is the allocation of the burden or
benefit of fluctuations, with some individuals
facing much larger costs than others, that is
of concern, There are two ways for an econ-
omist to address this problem. The first is to
attempt to stabilize the aggregate economy,
the traditional focus of policy-oriented
macroeconomics, The second is to ask why
the market does not provide some form
of insurance.
The recent debate over the nature of the
monetary transmission mechanism can be
thought of in similar terms. According to
the original textbook IS-LM view of money
changes in policy are important only insofar
as they affect aggregate outcomes. Only the
fluctuation in total investment is important
since policies only affect the required rate of
return on new investment projects, and so it
is only the least profitable projects (economy-
wide) that are no longerfunded. But since
the most profitable projects continue to be
undertaken, there are no direct efficiency
losses associated with the distributional
aspects of the policy-induced interest
rate increase,
In contrast, the “lending” view focuses
on the distributional consequences ofmone-
tary pohcy actions. By emphasizing acombi-
nation of capital market imperfections and
portfolio balance effects based on imperfect
assetsubstitutability, this alternative theory
suggests the possibility that the policy’s inci-
dence may differ substantially across agents
in the economy Furthermore, the policy’s
impact has to do with characteristics ofthe
individuals that are unrelated to the inherent
creditworthiness ofthe investment projects.
Anentrepreneur may be deemed unworthy
ofcredit simply because ofa currently low
networth, regardless ofthe social return to
the project being proposed. It is important
to understand whether the investment
declines created by monetary policy shifts
have these repercussions,n
In this essay, I examine how one might
determine whether the cross-sectional effects
ofmonetary policy are quantitatively impor-
tant. My goal is to provide a critical evaluation
of the major contributions to the literature
thus far. The discussion proceeds in three
steps. I start in the first section with a
description ofa general framework that
encompasses all views of the transmission
mechanism as special cases, thereby high-
hghting the distinctions. In the second section,
Ibegin a review of the empirical evidence
with an assessment of how researchers typi-
cally measure monetary policy shifts, The
following two sections examine the methods
The francial accelerator, ir which
the impact ea ianestmeet of small
interest changes is mognified by
balance sheet effects, is (Iso an
important part of many discussions
of the lending niew.
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2 See lngersall (1987) forecon
plete descf ptian of this problem.
[allowing the treditnnal francial
economics approach, I bane avoirhd
discussing demand and supply
explicitly. Irstead, the onset
demands ore derined Irom the idea
of arbitrage relaflnnships among nil
of tIne assets.
These include the limited parficipa-
tan models based er Lucas
(1990). See the survey byFexrst
(1993), aswell as the summary in
Chdstiann and lichenhoam
l1992L
used for differentiating between the theories.
Studies fall into two broad categories
depending on whether they use aggregate or
disaggregate data. The third section discusses
the aggregate data, while the fourth section







Oneway ofposing the fundamental
question associated with understanding the
monetary transmission mechanism is to ask
how seemingly trivial changes in the supply
of an outside asset can create large shifts in
the gross quantity of assets that are in zero
net supply I-lowis it that small movements
in the monetary base (ornonborrowed
reserves) translate into large changes in
demand deposits, loans, bonds and other
securities, thereby affecting aggregate invest-
ment and output?
The various answers no this puzzle can
be understood within the framework origi-
nally proposed by Brainard and Tobin (1963).
Their paradigm emphasizes the effects of
monetary policy on investor portfolios, and
is easy to present using the insights from
Fama’s (1980) seminal paper on therelation-
ship between financial intermediation and
central banks.
Fama’s view of financial intermediaries
is the limit of the current type of financial
innovation, because it involves the virtual
elimination of banks as depository institu-
tions. The setup focuses on an investor’s
portfolio problem in which an individual
must choose which assets to hold given the
level of real wealth. Labeling the portfolio
weight on asset i as w,, and total wealth as
W then the holding ofasset, i—the asset
demand—is just X, = w1W
In general, the investor is dividing
wealth among real assets—real estate, equity
and bonds—and outside money Eachasset
has stochastic return, ~,, with expectation ~
and the vector ofasset returns,~,has a
covariance structure F. Given autility func-
tion, as well as a process for consumption, it is
possible to compute the utility maximizing
portfolio weights. These will depend on the
mean and variance of the returns.~and F,
the moments of the consumption process,
call these p.r, and a vector of taste parameters
that I will label 4, and assume to be constants.
The utility maximizing asset demands can be
expressed as = w*,(’~,fl ~
This representation makes clear than
asset demands can change for two reasons.
Changes in either the returns process (~, F
or macroeconomic quantities (~, W) will
affect the XIs,3
At the most abstract level, financial
intennediaries exist to carryout two functions.
First, they execute instructions to change
portfolio weights. That is, following a change
in one or all ofthe stochastic processes driving
consumption, wealth or returns, the interme-
diary will adjust investors’ portfolios so that
they continue to maximize utility In addition,
ifone investor wishes to transfer some wealth
to another for some reason, the intermediary
will effectthe transaction.
What is monetary policy in this stylized
setup? Forpolicy to even exist, some gov-
ernment authority, such as acentral bank,
must be the monopoly supplier ofa nominally
denominated asset that is imperfectly substi-
tutable with all other assets. Iwill call this
asset “outside money” In the current envi-
ronment, it is the monetary base. There is a
substantial literature on how the demand for
outside money arises endogenously in the
context of the type ofenvironment I have
just described.4 But in addition, as Fama
emphasizes, there may be legal requirements
that force agents to use this particular asset
for certain transactions. Reserverequirements
and the use of reserves for certain types of
hank clearings are examples.
Within this stylized setup, apolicy action
is a change in the nominal supply of outside
money For such a change to have any
effects atall, (1) the central hank controls
the supply of an asset that is both in demand
and for which there is no perfect substitute,
and (2) prices must fail to adjust fully and
instantaneously Otherwise, a change in the
nominal quantity of outside money cannot
have any impact on the real interest rate, and
will have no real effects. But, assuming that
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the policymaker can change the real return
on the asset that is monopolistically supplied,
investors’ portfolio weights must adjust in
response to a policy change.
The view of financial intermediaries that
is implicit in this description serves to high-
light the Brainard and Tobin (1963) insight
that monetary pohcy can be understood by
focusing solely on the endogenous response
of investor portfolios. Understanding the
transmission mechanism requires a charac-
terization of how asset holdings change in
response to policy actions.
Second, even though there need be no
banks as we know them, there will surely be
intermediaries that perform the service of
making small business loans. The agency
costs and monitoring problems associated
with this type of debtwill still exist, and spe-
cialists in evaluation will emerge. While they
will have such loans as assets, they most
likely will not have bank deposits as liabihties.
Such entities will be brokers, and the loans
will he bundled and securitized,
With this as background, it is now
possible to sketch the two major views of the
monetary transmission mechanism. There
are anumber of excellent surveys ofthese
theories, including Bernanke (1993a),
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Kashyap
and Stein (l994a) and Hubbard (1995).
Asa result, I will be relatively brief in
my descriptions.
flflE MON.EY VIEVI
The first theory commonly labeled
the money view, is based on the notion that
reductions in the quantity of outside money
raise real rates of return,5 This, in turn,
reduces investment because fewer profitable
projects are available at higherrequired rates
of return—this is a movenuent alonga fixed
marginal efficiency of investment schedule.
The less substitutable outside money is
for other assets, the larger the interest
rate changes.
There is no real need to discuss banks
in this context, In fact, there is no reason
to distinguish any of the “other” assets in
investors’ portfolios. In terms of the simple
portfolio model, the money view implies
that the shift in the w~s for all of the assets
excluding outside money are equal.
An important imphcation of this tradi-
tional model of the transmission mechanism
involves the incidence of the investment
decline. Sincethere are no externalities or
market imperfections, it is only the least
socially productive projects that go unfunded.
The capital stock is marginally lower. But,
given that a decline is going to occur, the
allocation of the decline across sectors is
socially efficient.
This theory actually points to a measure
of money that is rarely studied, Most empiri-
cal investigations ofmonetary policy trans-
mission focus on M2, but the logic of the
portfolio view suggests that the monetary
base is more appropriate. It is also worth
pointing out that investigators have found
it extremelydifficult to measure economically
significant responses of either fixed or inven-
tory investment to changes in interest rates
that are plausibly the result ofpolicy shifts,
In fact, most ofthe evidence that is interpreted
as supporting the money view is actually evi-
dence that fails to support the lending view.
THE LIEHDffNO ViEW:
BALANCE ~.w~rr:._ ;EPECTS
The second theory ofmonetary trans-
mission is the lending view,6 It has two parts,
one that does not require introduction of
assets such as hank loans, and one that does.
The first is sometimes referred to as the broad
lending channel, orfinancial accelerator, and
emphasizes the innpact of policy changes on
the balance sheets of borrowers. Ithears
substantial similarity to the mechanism oper-
ating in the money view, because it involves
the impact ofchanges in th~real interest rate
on investment.
According to this view, there are credit
market imperfections that make thecalcula-
tion of the marginal efficiency of investment
schedule more complex. Due to information
asymmetries and moral hazard problems, as
well as bankruptcy laws, the state ofa firm’s
balance sheet hasimplications for its ability
to obtain external finance. Policy-induced
increases in interest rates (which are both real
and nominal) can cause a deterioration in
lerminalogy has the potenflnl to
create confusion here. Ihave cho-
sen the troditianal term for this
textbook IS-tM ar ‘narrow’ money
new. Ida not mean to imply that
this is the ‘monetaist’ view af the
transmission mechanism.
follaw Kashyap and Stein’s
11 994al terminology rather than
the more common credit xiew to
emphasize the importance of loans
in the erarsmissian mechanism.
lerranke and Gerfier (1989,
19901 pravide the original thearet’
cal underpinnings for this view.
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lernunke, Gertler and Gilchriso
(1994) refer to this nsa financiol
occebruro-since itcoases small
changes in interest rates no have
potentially large effects on invest-
mentand output.
°lt maybe particularly difficult ox dis-
tagaish these effects from those
that arise from oaryiag cyclicnlity of
differentfirms’ soles and profitability.
o See James (1987) for a discussion
of the oniqueness of bark loans.
mx With nominal rigidity, a decrease in
outside money reduces the price
level slowly, and so the real return
to holding money increases. This
channel of transmission requires
that inoestors shift awayfrom loans
in response.
Koshyap and Stein (1994b) point
out that large banks car issue (Os
in away that insulates their hal
ence sheets from contractor in
deposits, hat small barks cannot.
So long assmall banks are an
important source xl funds far same
hnnk’dependert firms, there will
soIl be a honklending channel. In
other wards, for honk lending to be
an important partof the traesmis-
sian mechanism, credit market
impemfectons mest be impartaet
far honks.
the firm’snet worth, by both reducing expected
future sales and increasing the real value of
nominally denominated debt, With lower net
worth, thefirm is less creditworthy because it
has an increased incentive to misrepresent
the riskiness ofpotential projects. Asa result,
potential lenders will increase therisk pre-
mium they require when making a loan. The
asymmetry ofinformation makes internal
finance ofnew investment projects cheaper
than external finance.
The balance sheet effects imply that the
shape ofthe marginal efficiency of investment
curve is itself a function of the debt-equity
ratio in the economy and can be affected by
monetary policy7 In terms of a simple text-
book analysis, policy moves both the IS and
the LM curves. For a given change in therate
of return on outside money (whichmay be
the riskless rate), a lender is less willing to
finance a given investment the more debt a
potential borrower has. This points to two
clear distinctions between the money and
the lending views—the latter stresses both
the distributional impact of monetary policy
and explains how seemingly small changes
in interest rates can have a large impact on
investment (the financialaccelerator).
Returning to the portfolio choice model,
the presence of credit market imperfections
means thatpolicy affects the covariance
structure of asset returns, As a result, the
w7s will shift differentiallyin response to
monetary tightening as the perceived riski-
ness ofdebt issued by firms with currently
high debt-equity ratios will increase relative
to that of others.8
The second mechanism articulated by
proponents of the lending channel can be
described by dividing the “other” assets in
investors’ portfolios into at least three cate-
gories: outside money, “loans” and all the
others. Next, assume that there are firms for
which loansare the only source of external
funds—some firms cannot issue securities.0
Depending on thesolution to the portfolio
allocation problem, apolicy action may
directly change both the interest rate and
the quantity of loans, It is not necessary to
havea specific institutional framework in
mind to understand this, Instead, it occurs
wheneverloans and outside money are
complements in investor portfolios; that is,
whenever the portfolio weight on loans is a
negative function of the return on outside
money for given means and covariances of
other asset returns.no
The argumenthas two clear parts. First,
there areborrowers who cannot finance
new projects except through loans, and
second, policy changes have adirect effect
on loan supply Consequently the most
important impact ofa policy innovation is
cross-sectional, as it affects the quantity of
loans to loan-dependent borrowers.
Most of the literature on the lending view
focuses on the implications of this mechanism
in aworld in which banks are the only source
ofloansand whose habilities are largely
reservable deposits. In this case, areduction
in the quantity ofreserves forcesareduction
in the level of deposits, which must be
matched by a fall in loans. Theresulting
change in the interest rate on outside money
willdepend on access to close bank deposit
substitutes. But the contraction in bank bal-
ance sheets reduces the level of loans. Lower
levels of bank loans will only have an impact
on the real economy insofar as there are
firms without an alternative source of
investment funds.
As a theoretical matter, it is not necessary
to focus narrowly on contemporarybanks in
trying to understand the different possible
ways in which policy actions have real effects.
As I have emphasized, bank responses to
changes in the quantity of reserves arejust
one mechanism that can lead to a comple-
mentarity between outside money and loans.
Aspointed out by Romer and Romer (1990),
to the extent that there exist ready substitutes
in bank portfohos for reservabledeposits such
as CDs, this specific channel could he weak
to nonexistent,mn But it remains a real possi-
bility that the optimal response ofinvestors
to apolicy contraction would be to reduce
the quantity ofloans in their portfolios.
The portfolio choice model also helps to
make clear that the manner in which policy
actions translate into loan changes need not
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be aresult ofloan rationing, although it
maynz As Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) originally
pointed out, a form of rationing may arise in
equilibrium as a consequence ofadverse
selection, But the presence of alending
channel does not require that there be
borrowers willing to take on debt at the cur-
rent price who arenot given loans. It arises
when there are firms which do not have
equivalent alternative sources ofinvestment
funds and loans areimperfect substitutes in
investors’ portfolios.
Obviously, the central bank can take
explicit actions directed at controlling the
quantity ofloans. Again, lowering the level
ofloans will have a differential impact that
depends on access to financing substitutes.
But the mechanism by which explicit credit
controls influence the real economy is a
different question.tm°
“54cr
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CONBiiX lOTIONS
Distinguishing between these two views
is difficult because contractionary monetary
policy actions have two consequences,
regardless of the relative importance of the
money and lending mechanisms. It both
lowers current real wealth and changes the
portfolio weights.nx
Assuming that there are real effects,
contractionary actions will reduce future
output and lower current real wealth, reducing
the demand for all assets. In the context of
standard discussions of the transmission
mechanism, this is thereduction in investment
demand that arises from a cyclical downturn.8
The second effect of policy is to change
the mean and covariance ofexpected asset
returns, This changes the w55’s. In the simplest
case in which there are two assets, outside
money and everything else, the increasein
the return on outside money will reduce the
demand for everything else. This is areduc-
tion in real investment.
The lending view implies that the
change in portfolio weights is more complex
and in an important way There may be
some combination of balance sheet and loan
supply effects.
This immediately suggests thatlooking
at aggregates for evidence ofthe right degree
of imperfect substitutability or timing of
changes may be very difficult, What seems
promising is to focus on the other distinction
between the two views—the lending view’s
assumption that some firms are dependent
on loans for financing.
In addition to differences stemming
from the relative importance of shifts in loan
demand and loan supply the lending view
also predicts cross-sectional differences arising
from balance sheet considerations, These are
also likely to be testable. In particular, it
may be possible to observe whether, given
the quality of potential investment projects,
firms with higher networth are more likely
to obtain external funding. Again, the major
implications are cross-sectional.
EMPIRICAL t
Before discussing any empiricalexami-
nation of the monetary transmission mecha-
nism, two questions must be addressed.
First, do nominal shocks in fact have real
effects? Unless monetary policy influences
the real economy it seems pointless to study
the way in which policy changeswork.
Second, how can we measure monetary
policy? In order to calculate the impact of
monetary policy we need aquantitative
measure that can reliably be associated with
policy changes.
Here I take up each of these issues. In
the following section, 1will weigh the evi-
dence on the real effects of money This is
followed by adiscussion of ways in which
recent studies have attempted to identify
monetary shocks.
%C OTtL c-ntcCLil c~
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Modern investigation of the impact of
money on real economic activity began with
Friedman and Schwartz (1963). In many
ways, this is still the mostpowerful evidence
in support of the claim that monetary policy
plays an important role in aggregate fluctua-
tions. Through an examination that spanned
52 Since there must be firms thanore
loan-dependent, there is sf11 some
form of rationing in the security
market.
xx See tamer and Ramer (1993) for
a concise discussion of recent
episodes in which the Federal
Reserve has attempted na chunge
the compositon of honk holonce
sheets through means other than
snundard policy actions.
H The change in portfolio weights can
rise either from any combination
of a charge in the return on the
oetside asset, a change in the
covariance structrre xf returns, or
shift in the consumption process.
~In general equilibrium, there is an
offsetting effect that arises from
the increase in the ietereso rate. All
other things equal, this would
increase saving and therefore
investment. lx? we can be faidy
confident that so long as maneoary
policy ighteniag can caese a reces-
sian, the impact ofthe income and
wealth declines will he large
enough that inoestment will foil.
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56 The equinalent apen economy
observation is that in small open
economies, enchorge rates move in
response to changes in policy.
xx Boschen and Mills (19921 describe
a related technique.
~°See Hamilton 11994) for a complete
descriptor af the methodalogy.
~The enact measrres and sample fol-
low those of Krshyap and Stein
(1 994rl, who kindly supplied the
data.
numerous monetary regimes, they argue that
apparently exogenous monetary policy actions
preceded output movements.
Recent researchers use more sophisticated
statistical tools to study the correlations
between money and income. This “money-
income causality” literature is largelyinconclu-
sive, becauseit fails to establish convincingly
either that money “caused” output or the
reverse. In the end, the tests simply establish
whether measures of moneyforecast output,
not whether there is causation. Given that
outside money—the monetary base—is less
than 10 percdnt of the size of M2, it is not
surprising that economists find thesimul-
taneity problems inherent in the question
too daunting and give up.
Two pieces of evidence seem reasonably
persuasive in making the case that money
matters. First, the Federal Reserve seems to
he able to change the federal funds rate vir-
tually without warning. (I am not arguing
that this is necessarily a good idea,just that
it is possible.) In the very short run, these
nominal interest rate changes cannot be
associated with changes in inflationary
expectations, and so they must represent
real interest rate movements, Such real
interest rate changes almost surelyhave an
impact on real resource allocations,ra
The second piece of evidence comes
from the examination ofthe neutrahty of
money in Cecchetti (1986, 1987). In those
papers, I establish that output growth is
significantly correlated with money growth
at lags ofup to 10 years! There are several
possibleinterpretations of these findings,
but they strongly suggest thatmonetary
shocks have something to do with aggregate
real fluctuations.
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It stands to reason that before one can
study the monetary transmission mecha-
nism, it is necessary to identify monetary
shocks. A number of authors have argued
convincingly that policy disturbances cannot
be gauged by examining movements in the
monetary aggregates. The reason is that the
variance in the innovations to broad measures
of money are a combination ofendogenous
responses to real shocks (King and Plosser,
1984) and shifts in money demand
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1992).
There have been two reactions to the
fact thatmonetary aggregates provide little
insight into policyactions. Both begin by
looking at the functioning of the Federal
Reserve and examining how policy is actually
formulated. The first, due to Bernanke and
Blinder (1992), note that the federalfunds
rate is theactual policy instrument that is used
on aday-to-day basis, This suggests that
innovations to the federal funds rateare likely
to reflect, atleast in part, policy disturbances.
The main justification for their conclusion
comes from examining the instittitions of how
monetary policy is carried out.
Romer and Romer (1989) suggest a
second method. By reading the minutes of
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
meetings, they have constructed aseries of
dates on which theybelieve policy
became contractionary.nT
:55
To understand the shortcomings ofthese
two approaches, I will describe how each is
used. Inthe first, researchers begin by specify-
ingavector autoregression. For thepurposes
ofthe example, I willuse theformulation in
Bernanke and Blinder’s (1992) Section IV
They employ a six-variable specification with
the total civilian unemployment rate, thelog of
the CPI, the federal funds rate, and the log of
three bank balance sheet measures, all in real
terms: deposits, securities and loans. The
assumption is that the federal funds rate is a
‘policy” variable, and so it is unaffected by all
other contemporaneous innovations,mn
Following Bernanke and Blinder, I esti-
mate the VARwith six lags using seasonally
adjusted monthly datumO Figures 1 and 2
plot some interesting results from this VAR.
The first figure shows the estimated residuals
from the federal funds rate equation. The
solid vertical lines are National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) reference cycle
peaks and troughs, while the dashed vertical
lines are the Romer and Romer dates, intend-
ed to indicate the onset of contractionary




This series looks extremely noisy and
it is hard to see how it could represent policy
changes. The 1979-82 period is the only
one with large positive or negative values.
Although it is surely the case that there are
unanticipated policy changes both when the
Federal Reserve acts and when it does not,
one would expect small normal shocks with
occasional spikes. Ifdecisions are really this
random, there is something fundamentally
wrong with the policymaking apparatus.
Furthermore, since the federal funds rate
itself is the equilibrium price inthe reserves
market, given technicalities of the way that
monetary policy is actually carried out, the
market-determined level of the funds rate is
not a policyinstrument.20
The second figure shows the response of
thelog of the CPI to a positive one percentage
point innovation in the federal funds rate. To
understand how this is computed, begin by
writing the vector autoregression as
Aa)y, =~x’
where AU.) is amatrix of polynomials in the
lagoperator L (L’Yx = yr,), y1 is the vector
of variables used in the estimation, and C 15
mean zero independent (but potentially het-
eroskedastic) error. The firststep is to esti-
mate the reduced form version of equation 1
by assuming that no contemporaneous vari-
ables appear on the right-hand side of any
equations (A(0) = I), This results in an esti-
mate A(L) alongwith an estimated covariance
matrix for the coefficient estimates—call
this (2. The impulse response functions
are obtained by inverting the estimated lag
polynomial B(L) =
But the point estimate of the impulse
response function is not really enough to
allow us to reach solid conclusions, It is also
important to construct confidence intervals
for the estimates. Thereare two ways to do
this. The first involves the technique that
has been called Monte Carlo Integration.
This is a Bayesian procedure thatinvolves
presuming that the distribution of the vector
of errorsin equation 1—the c’s—is i.i.d.
normal.22 Toavoid making such stringent
assumptions, I choose to estimate confidence
bands using an alternative technique grounded





















The delta method is the simple proce-
dure that comes from noting that if theesti-
mates of the coefficients in lagpolynomials
are asymptotically nonnally distributed, then
any well-behaved functionof these parameters
will also be asymptotically normally distrib-
uted. Stacking all of the parameters in A(L)
and calling the result 0, then
IT(o—o)~N(0,O).
It follows that any function ofthese
parameters [(0)—for example, the impulse
response function—will be asymptotically
normally distributed,
83 1989
20 (his entire discnssior ignores the
possibility that ont)cipa?Smona-
tery policy matters— something
than researchers should consider
bringing into the discussion.
< A simple way to calculate the vee
Inn moving-average form of equa-
tion I is to constmct the compom
mr form of the VAR as described in
Sargent (198/). This is also dis-
cussed in Hamilton (1994).
xx See loon (1990).
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13 A test for whether oil of the reae
tons ore jointly zero rejects ot the
percent level for the hrst seven
months, and then fails to reject
The test for whether all the effects
ore zero simnitrreously for oIl 24
months foils tu reject with o p-value
of 0./f.
on There is o further reason to niew
this measure of policy with same
skepticism. Because of the lorge
number of parameters estimated,
the regressions are usually orerfit-
ted. As a resnlt, they normally
hove very poor oat-of-sample fort
castieg properties.
25 See Friedman (1990) for o discos’
sion of the strategy of using policy-




which can be estimated numerically
The result plotted in Figure 2 was first
pointed out by Sims and isknown as the
“price puzzle.” Paradoxically the VAResti-
mates imply that monetary policy contrac-
tions lead to price increases! As is clearfrom
the estimated standard-error bands, this price
rise is significantly positive for approximately
the firstyear After two years, however’, it is
not possible to reject the hypothesis that a
funds rate increase has no effect on the price
level.2’
The standard conclusion is that the VAR
is misspecified in some way One strong pos-
sibility is that the funds rate is not exogenous
in the way that is required for this identifica-
tion to be valid, and so these innovations do
not accurately reflect policy movements.24
Myconclusions may be too harsh for the
following reason. AsBen Bernanke pointed
out in the conference, the estimated innova-
tions are the sum of true policy innovation,
policy responses to omitted variables, and
more general specification errors in the VAR.
As a result, one would expect them to be
noisy Furthermore, as pointed out by Adrian
Pagan, since one is primarily interested in the
impulse response functions—the impact of
unanticipated policy on output, prices and
the like—then it may be immaterial that the
estimated policy innovations are noisyeven
if the true innovations arenot.
ffla Kim-er as~sd .R-orrser Dates
The Romer and Romer dates have been
both widely used an4 extensively criticized.2’
They suffer from both technical and substan-
tive problems. First, they are discrete.
Presumably policychanges have both an
intensity and a timing. Ignoring the size of
policy changes must have an impact on
results. Second, Romer and Romer choose to
focus their inquiry only on policy contrac-
tions, because they feel that expansions were
more ambiguous. Since most models predict
symmetric responses to positive and negative
monetary innovations, this strategy throws
out information.
But the main issue is the exogeneity
of the policyshifts. It is difficult to believe
that the actions of the FOMC, as reported in
the minutes of the meetings, are truly exoge-
nous events, There have been two responses
to this. First, Hoover and Perez (1991) pro-
vide a lengthy discussion ofwhy Romer and
Romer’s methods are not compelling in iden-
tifying output fluctuations induced by exoge-
nous monetary shocks.
Taking a slightly different approach,
Shapiro (1994) examines whether the FOMC
is responding to changes in economic condi-
tions, and so there is some reaction function
implicit in policy He estimates aprobit
model for the Romer and Romer dates using
measures of inflation and unemployment,
both as deviationsfrom a carefully constructed
targetlevel, as determinants. Figure 3 repro-
duces his estimates of the probability ofa
date, with the vertical lines representing the
dates themselves. The unanticipated policy
action is 1 minus the estimated probability
As is clear from the figure, several of the
dates were largely anticipated, and there
were some periods when policy shifts were
thought to be likely and then did not occur.
Overall, Shapiro’s results suggest that the
standard interpretation of the dummy vari-
ables as exogenous is incorrect to varying
degrees over time.
There seems to be no way to measure
monetarypolicy actions that does not raise
serious objections. Given this, it might seem
difficult to see how to proceed with the study
of different theories of the transmission
mechanismn. Butthe literature proceeds in
two directions. The first uses these measures
directly in an attempt to gauge the influence
of policy changes directly The conclusions
of these studies must be viewed with some
degree ofskepticism. The alternative
approach is to note that investment declines
account for the major share of output reduc-
tions during recessions. Ifone is able to
show that the distribution of the contraction
in investment is correlated with variables
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Numerous studies have used aggregate
data in an attempt to distinguish the channels
of monetary transmission. This literature
can be divided into three categories: The
first looks at the relative forecastingability
of different quantity aggregates; the second
studies differences in the timing of the
response ofaggregate quantities to presumed
policy shocks; and the third examines the
behavior of interest rates.
Before examining the work on quantities,
I will discuss the use of interest rate data.2’
As is clear from the discussion in the first
section, the lending view does allow for
movements in market interest rates.
Furthermore, these movements are in the
same direction as those predicted by the
money view, and their magnitude depends
solely on the degree of substitutability
between outside money and various other
assets. Where the two views differ is in their
predictions for movements in the interest
rate on loans. But since there is currently no
secondary market for these securities, it is
impossible to determine the interest rate on
these loans.2’ This implies that market interest
rates are of virtually no use in this exercise.
There is no sense in which the behavior of
interest rates could serve to distinguish
between the money or lending views.
I now turn to the work on quantities. In
the following section, 1 examine tests involving
the relative forecasting ability of tneasures of
money and credit. This is followed by a dis-
cussion of papers that emphasize aggregate
tianing relationships.
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A number ofpapers have examined the
ability of different financial aggregates to
forecast output (or unemployment) fluctua-
tions. Ramey (1993) is a recent example.
The main methodology here is to askwhether
measures of credit are informative about
future output movements, once money has
~wssr assassa
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been taken into account. Theproblem with
this is that credit is usually just abroader
measure of money Toput it slightly differently
thebalance sheet identity ofthe banking
system implies that bank assets equal bank
liabilities. As Bernanke (1993b) points out,
monetary aggregates areameasure ofbank
habihties, while credit aggregates are measures
ofhank assets. Since these are calculated
slightly differently the)’ will not be identical.
But it is these technical measurement differ-
ences that are likely to account for the differ-
ences in forecasting ability not anything
about the transmission mechanism.
More generally the main finding is that
credit lags output. Unfortunately, this tells
us nothing about the transmission mechanism.
The aggregate data do show that aggregate
credit is cotantercyciicco!, hut it is easy to find
explanations for this thatare consistent with
the lending view. For example, Kiyotaki and
Moore (1993) presena a model in which indi-
viduals must continue to service credit even
after income falls, and so credit falls after
income even though it is the fundamental
source of fluctuations. In the end, it is diffi-
cult no see how aggregate timing relationships
can tell us anything at all about the way in
which monetary policy affects real activity2’
Aggregate ;Da.sigg ReIatia~rsships
The second use ofaggregate data has
been to examine the response of various
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financial quantities to policy innovations.
Returning toBernanke andBlinder (1992),
they study whether bank loans and securities
respond differently to federal funds rate
innovations.29 The standard methodology is
to calculate the impulse responses for the
two variables andnote that they look different.
Figure 4 reports the common finding, calcu-
lated using the six-variable Bernanke and
Blinder VARestimated over the 1959-90
sample. In response to a positive 1 percentage
point innovation in the federal funds rate,
the unemployment rate rises by nearly 0.1
percentage point after one-and-a-half years,
while banksecurities fall 0.07 percent and
loans decline 0.02 percent. Securities fall
both by a largeramount and more quickly
than loans.
But point estimates of these impulse
responses do not tell the entire story In
Figure 5, 1 plot the point estimate and two
standard error bands for the difference
between the impulse response for loans and
securities. This allows an explicit test of
whether these two assets are imperfectly sub-
stitutable in response to the shock. The dif-
ferences are individually greater than zero in
only a few months, and ajoint test of the first
24 months of the impulse response, which is
asymptotically distributed as a Chi-squared,
hasa p-value of0.70.
My conclusion is that reduced-form vec-
tor autoregressions are nearly incapable of
providing convincing evidence of a differential
impact offederal funds rate innovations on
various parts of bank balance sheets. These
results are based on the estimation ofa large
number of parameters with a relatively small
amount ofdata—this VARhas 237 parameters
and 354 data points—and so the estimates
are fairly imprecise.’0
But even if one were to find that the
impulse responses differed significantly this
would only bear on the substitutability of the
assets, and not directly on the validity of the
lending view, Both the prices and quantities
of perfect substitutes must have the same
stochastic process, and so finding that this
particular partial correlation isdifferent
would be evidence of imperfect substitutabil-
ity As Bernanke and Blinder (1992) make
clear in discussing their findings, this is a
necessary but not a sufficientcondition for
the lending view to hold. It is not possible,
using reduced-form estimates based on
aggregate data alone, to identify whether
bank balance sheet contractions are caused
by shifts in loan supply or loan demand.
What is needed is avariable that is known
to shift one curve but not the other.
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) also
provide evidence based on aggregate timing.
They compare the response of bank loans to
that of commercial paper issuance following
policy innovations. They find that monetary
policy contractions seem to decrease the
mix of loans relative to commercial paper.
Borrowers that can move away from direct
bank finance following a tightening appear
to do so. Both Friedman and Kuttner (1993),
and Oliner and Rudebusch (1993) take issue
with these findings and show that changes in
the mix are due to increases in the amount of
commercial paper issuance during a recession,
but that the quantity of bank loans does not
change. In addition, Oliner and Rudebusch
show that once fia’m size is taken into account,
and trade credit is included in the debt of the
small firms, the mix of financing is left unaf-
fected by policy changes.
It is worth making an additional point
about the commercial paper market. First,
Post (1992) documents that all commercial
paper rated by arating agency must have a
backup source of liquidity which is generally
abank line ofcredit or astandby letter of
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have tried two vatants of the
Bemanke and Blinder VAR method
that might seem promising ways of
addressing the problem of neasor-
ing monetary policy changes. In
the first, Isabsttemted the fends rate
forget us reported in Sellan 11994)
far the actual funds rate. This has
very little impact on the results, as
the fed comes extremely close to
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credit. This means that commercial paper is
an indirect liability ofbanks, albeit one that
is not on their balance sheet. Furthermore,
Calomiris, Himmelberg andWachtel (1994)
suggest that increases in commercial paper
issuance are accompanied by an increase in
trade credit. This means that a pohcy con-
traction may simply cause are-shuffling of
creditby forcing banks to move liabilities off
of theirbalance sheet such that large firms
issue commercial paper in order to provide
trade credit to smallfirms that would have
otherwise come from banks.
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There is a large empirical literature using
cross-sectional data that is relevant to under-
standing the channels of monetary pohcy
These studies fall into groups that separately
address the two parts of the lending view.
The first set of papers tries to gauge the
importance ofcapital market imperfections
on investment, and so is related to the balance
sheet effects described in the firstsection.
The second set, which is fairly small, examines
time-series variation in cross-sectional data
in an attempt to characterize the distributional
effects of monetary policy directly I will
briefly describe each of these strategies.
5<5 <
5
5<—’,o— 5 0 -
n5ie-aeuritoq c<apffa.f ty<larr4er
iri<iperk’ct°Ia’ns
The literature on capital market imper-
fections is an outgrowth of the vast work
done on the detenninants of investment.
The general finding in this literature is that
internal finance is less costly than external
finance for firms that have poor access to
primary capital markets.
The empirical studies fallinto two cate-
gories. The first examines reduced-form
correlations, whilethe second looks directly at
the relationship between the cost and expected
return to a marginal investment project—they
estimate structural Fuler equations.
Redu~cesd-FtrrroCarreIatións
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988)
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pioneered the technique ofdividing firm-level
data into groups usingmeasures thought to
correspond to the project monitoring costs
created by information asymmetries, and
then seeing if the correlation between invest-
ment and cash-flow measures varies across
the groups. The finding in awide range of
studies is that investment is more sensitive
to cash-flow variables for firms who have
ready access to outside sources of funds.3t
The main issue in interpreting these
results is whether the characteristics ofthe
firm used to split the sample are exogenous
to financing decisions. Measures of firm
size, dividend policies, bond ratings and the
hke maybe related to thequahty ofinvestment
projects a firm has available, and so lender
discrimination may not be a consequence of
asymmetric information.
There are several examplesin which
researchers identify potentiafly constrained
finns based on institutional characteristics, and
so the endogeneity problems are mitigated.
I will mention two, Hoshi, Kashyap and
Scharfstein (1991) find that investment by
Japanese firms that weremembers of a
keiretsu, or industrial group, was not influ-
enced by liquidity effects. Using data on
individual hospitals, Calem and Rizzo (1994)
find that investment depends more heavily on
cash-flow variables forsmall, single-unit hos-
pitals than for large, network-affiliated ones.
In the most convincing study of this
twe, Calomiris and Hubbard (1993) study
25 lernanke, Gertlen and Gilchrist
(1994) survey the large number of
studies that use this appmach.
FEDERAL RESERVE BARK OF ST. LOUIS




‘°Oliaer and tadebesch (1994) and
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchnist
11994) obtain similar results esing
theOft data as well.
the undistributed corporate profits tax in
1936 and 1937 to estimate the differences in
financing costs directly from firms’ responses
to the institution of a graduated surtax
intended to force anincrease in the dividend
payout rate. Their results, holding investment
opportunities fixed, are that investment
spending is affected by the level of internal
funds only for those firms with lowlevels of
dividend payments and high marginal tax
rates. Furthermore, these tended to be
smaller and faster growing firms.
brructurat n<rts<ric~rton
The neoclassical theory of investment
allows one to derive the complexequilibrium
relationship among the capital stock, rates of
return, future marginal value products and
project costs that form the first-order condi-
tions for a firm’sproblem. With theappro-
priate data, it is then possible to see whether
these Euler equations hold. Hubbard and
Kashyap (1992) is an interesting use ofthis
technique. Following the work of Zeldes
(1989) on consumption, they examine
whether the ability of agricultural firms
to meet this first-order condition depends
on the extent of their collaterizable net
worth. They find thatduring periods when
farmers have high net worth, and so have
better access to external financing, their
investment behavior is more likely to look as
if it is unconstrained.
These investment studies have been very
successful in establishing the existence of
capital market imperfections as well as their
likelysource in information asymmetries
arising from monitoring problems. While
the work has little to sayabout monetary
policy directly it does provide an excellent
characterization of the distributional effects
ofchanges in the health of firms’balance
sheets regardless ofthe source.
thne-ziseryes LCo.taeroc.te
The strategy in the second set of studies
is to use the cross-sectional dimension to
identify the transmission mechanism, The
goal is to determine whether the reduction in
loans during monetary contractions is acon-
sequence of shifts in loan demand or loan
supply My conclusion is that these studies
fail to establish the desired result in acon-
vincing way Instead, they provide further
evidence of capital market imperfections.
Three major studies use data on manu-
facturing firms. In the first, Gertler and
Hubbard (1988) find that the impact of cash
flow on investment is higher during recessions
for firms that retain a high percentage of
their earnings. The second, by Kashyap,
Lamont and Stein (1992), shows that during
the 1981-82 recession, the inventories of
firmswithout ready access to external
finance fell by more when their initial level
of internal cash was lower. On the other
hand, the inventory investment behavior of
firmswith ready access to primary capital
markets showed no evidence ofliquidity
constraints. In the third, Gertlerand
Gilchrist (1994) use the Quarterly Financial
Report forMantefacturing Corporations (QFR)
to divide firms into asset-size categories and
find that small firmsaccount for adispropor-
tionate share of the decline in manufacturing
following amonetary shock,’2
Both Kashyap and Stein (1994b) and
Peek and Rosengren (forthcoming) focus on
the behavior of lenders rather than borrow-
ers. By examining the cyclical behavior of
banks, Kashyap and Stein hope to findevi-
dence for the importance of loan supply
shifts, The strongest result in theirpaper is
that, following a monetary contraction, the
total quantity ofloans held by small banks
falls while that of large banks does not. By
contrast, Peek and Rosengren study New
England banks during the 1990-91 recession
and find that poorly capitalized banks shrink
by more than equivalent institutions with
higher net worth. My interpretation is that
both ofthese show that the capital market
imperfections commonly found to apply to
manufacturing firms apply to banks as well.
There are two difficulties inherent in any
attempt to establish that the important trans-
mission rhechanism for monetary policy
shocks is through bank loan supply shifts.
First, as described at length in the second
section, there is the problem of empirically
identifying monetary policy Beyond this,
there is the subtlety of distinguishing loan
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supply shifts from the balance sheet effects.
Is the observed reduction in loans aconse-
quence of their complementarity with outside
money caused by the structure of the banking
system, or is it the result of changes in the
shape ofthe marginal efficiency ofinvestment
schedule brought on by the balance sheet
effects? Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1992)
suggest one possible way of distinguishing
these possibilities. Ifone canfind a reces-
sionary period that was not precededby a
monetary contraction, and show that interest
rates rose but that bank dependence was
irrelevant to individual firms’experiences,
this would mean that banks are responsible
for the distributional effects induced by
monetary shocks. Unfortunately such
evidence is not readily available.
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After asurvey of the work that attempts
to distinguish theories of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism, where do we stand?
My conclusion is that the myriad studies
have succeeded in establishing the empirical
importance of creditmarket imperfections.
This means that monetary policy shifts have
an important distributional aspect that
cannot he addressed within the traditional
money view. It is the smaller and faster
growing firmsthat bear adisproportionate
share of the burden imposed by a recession.
Since these are likely to he firms with highly
profitable investment opportunities, this has
important implications for social welfare.
Not only are recessions associated with
aggregate output and investment declines,
but the declines are inefficient.
Beyond this, there is the issue of distin-
guishing the two parts of the lending view.
Do we care if we can distinguish changes in
investment opportunities resulting from
financial accelerator effects from bank loan
supply shifts per se? Does the conclusion
have implications for the actual conduct of
monetary policy? I believe the answer is yes.
If the complementarity ofbank loans and
outside money arises largely as a result of the
financial regulatory environment, then, with
financial innovation and liberalization, these
effects are likely to become less important
over time. With the introduction ofinterstate
banking and the development of more
sophisticated instruments aimed at trading
pools ofloans, it is only the balance sheet
effects that will remain, Asaresult, it is
important to knowwhich is the more impor-
tant channel of monetary policy transenission.
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